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Abstract The mental lexicon has served as an
almost ideal meeting ground for the cognitive
sciences. In order for research on lexical processing
to fulfill its potential to provide the elusive links
among brain, cognition and culture, it is necessary to
re-examine the view that the mental lexicon is a
knowledge store of discrete lexical items. I suggest
that metaphors from quantum physics, in particular the
notions of wave/particle duality and superposition, are
extremely valuable to an understanding of the contents
of the mental lexicon and to the framing of research
methodologies. Taken together, these perspectives
lead us away from the assumption that the mind/brain
contains representations for words. What they lead us
toward is the view that the observation of words in the
world may not require the postulation of words in the
mind/brain.
The quantum metaphor and the organization
of words in the mind
At the time of writing, no research team has been able
to look into the human brain and see a word. Yet, we
all have a strong intuition that words are represented
there in some form or other. There are good reasons to
hold this view.We learn words and we can recall them.
We can point to objects and name them. Speakers of
more than one language can name objects in one
language and then provide a translation in another
language. It seems obvious that this ability requires
that speakers of a language possess a store of words, a
mental lexicon, that is both cognitively and neurolog-
ically real.
Over the past decades, great progress has been
made in understanding how words are represented in
the mind. We have identified the fundamental patterns
of word recognition, we have identified many of the
lexical variables that modulate those patterns, we have
constructed models that differentiate between the
modalities of speech and reading, and we have
developed findings that distinguish between the pro-
cessing of morphologically simple words such as the
English word board and its various related morpho-
logically complex forms such as boarding, re-board,
and boardroom. Finally, we have advanced the
understanding of how words that are related to one
another semantically both facilitate and inhibit one
another in word recognition experiments (Baayen
2007; Libben et al. 2012).
These advances in knowledge and the many
hundreds of psycholinguistic experiments that have
been conducted over the last decades of research on
words in the mind have now created a paradoxical and
pivotal state of affairs in the field. The paradox is that
the construct of the mental lexicon as a dictionary in
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the mind, which has enabled these advances, may need
to be re-conceptualized in order to deal with them.
But, this is also a pivotal opportunity to advance
understanding. Just as the original introduction of the
construct of the mental lexicon by Oldfield (1966)
served to create an ideal meeting ground for the
cognitive sciences, it may be the case that a re-
conceptualization of the mental lexicon can create the
meeting ground that will enable the elusive links
among the terms Brain, Cognition, and Culture. My
goal in this paper is to present a framework for this
reconceptualization.
How do we need to re-conceptualize words
in the mind
Psycholinguists who work on the representation and
processing of words in the mind and brain are well
aware of the fact that it is very unlikely that anything
like a desktop dictionary exists in the mind/brain. Yet,
we expect that the memory store that we call the
mental lexicon has many of the features of a desktop
dictionary (Aitchison 2012). It would contain repre-
sentations of the forms of words in both their written
and spoken manifestations. It would either contain, or
possess links to, meaning representations. It would
provide an indication of whether a word contains
morphological elements such as prefixes or suffixes,
and it would allow links to other words that are related
to it by virtue of their form and/or meaning.
These expected characteristics of the mental lexi-
con support a view of the mental lexicon as a
dictionary in the mind. This dictionary would of
course not be organized as an alphabetical listing.
Indeed, it is relatively unlikely that it would be
organized as a listing at all (but see Forster
1976, 2007).
Implicit in the discussion above is the assumption
that it is scientifically profitable to analyze the ways in
which the putative dictionary in our minds corre-
sponds to attested dictionaries in the world. In many
ways, this assumption seems warranted and attractive.
The mental lexicon is the cognitive domain that links
representations to one another. This is what dictionar-
ies do. From the earliest times, what we call
dictionaries have been lists of words. And from the
fact that we have seen lists of words in the world, it
seems plausible that there are lists (or at least stores) of
words in the minds of people. Yet there is danger in the
attractiveness of such an analogy. It might be the case
that we only suspect that there are words in the mind
because we are familiar with words in the world. This
is a very natural tendency in the cognitive sciences,
and one from which it is difficult to break free.
Consider, as an example, the case of writing
systems. It seems intuitively obvious to literate
speakers of English that words of their language are
composed of consonants and vowels. The reason for
this is straightforward. The writing system that is a
concretization of the language presents it that way.
But, on the other hand, using the same logic and the
same type of evidence, a literate native speaker of
Arabic or Hebrew would see (both literally and
figuratively) words of his or her language as composed
of consonants, because the writing system presents it
that way. For readers of languages whose written
forms use syllabaries, it would be the syllable. For
readers of Chinese, it might be the logographic
character, for readers of Korean, it might be the
syllable structured into a CV-(C) template. In one way,
such views carry with them fallacies supported by the
allure of external concreteness. We see an external
representation of a language and suppose that one
reason for our ability to speak and understand the
language is that we possess those external represen-
tations. In one way, as I discuss below, this is very
unlikely to be true. It basically amounts to using a
technological invention and then putting that inven-
tion back in our heads as a hypothesis about cognitive
structure. In another way, however, it is not com-
pletely unreasonable. It is not an accident that English
is written with vowels and consonants whereas
Semitic languages such as Arabic and Hebrew rely
on consonants for their representations. As technolog-
ical innovations, the writing systems were created to
meet the needs of language users and to accord with
the properties of specific languages.
Now, how do principles and examples such as these
relate back to words in the mind? It is very likely that
we do the same things with words as we do with
symbols of writing. It is not an accident that we have
physical dictionaries that list words as discrete entities.
They are likely to be the entities that most correspond
to processes in the mind and brain. But, it is quite
unlikely that they are those processes. Just because we
have dictionaries in the world, does not mean that we
can take these measurable external manifestations and
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assume that they are isomorphically represented in our
minds. This is not particularly controversial. It is
unlikely that any psycholinguist or neurolinguist
working today would hold such a view of the relation
between a dictionary and a mental lexicon. The next
step in this line of reasoning, however, might be
somewhat more controversial. This step concerns
words themselves, those putative representations that
make up the mental lexicon. It does not seem to me
that we are safe in supposing that we have words, as
words, in the mind. It seems to me more likely that the
notion of a word as discrete concrete entity only has
reality in the outside world of measureable language
behaviour. This distinction between the observable
world and an internal, less-visible one has been central
in the study of cognition for much of the twentieth
century. But, interestingly, as I will discuss below,
there are very substantial parallels between the issues
surrounding the representation of words in the mind
and the issues that were dealt with by quantum
physicists in the first part of the twentieth century.
And, there is an interesting link between the history of
quantum physics and the history of psychology.
The quantum connection
As Smith (2006) has brought to light, members of the
first generation of quantum physicists all came from
academic families with broad interests in both the
humanities and natural sciences.NielsBohr’s fatherwas
a physiologist who was twice nominated for the Nobel
Prize. Niels Bohr had strong connections to philosophy
and had read a great deal of the work ofWilliam James.
Indeed, he used James’ notions of stream of conscious-
ness in his understanding of the quantum world. As the
work ofHunt (2001) andSmith (2006) reveal, it is not an
accident that the metaphors used in the explanations of
constructs in quantum physics such as wave/particle
duality, uncertainty, and superposition are easily trans-
ferable to the psychological domain. Indeed, it is very
likely that they came from that domain in the first place.
Hunt (2001) provides a particularly revealing quote
from Bohr (1934):
The unavoidable influence on atomic phenom-
ena caused by observing them corresponds to the
well-known change of the tinge of the psycho-
logical experiences which accompanies any
direction of the attention to one of their various
elements (Bohr 1934, p. 100).
This was very much the view ofWilliam James who
drew an important distinction between the natural
internal state of the mind as characterized by a
dynamic and fluid consciousness and the much more
‘particle-like’ representations that we might try to
capture from the stream of consciousness. James’
(1890) characterization of such attempts employs
images such as ‘‘trying to examine the structure of a
snowflake by holding it in your warm hand’’, or trying
to ‘‘turn on the light quickly enough to see how the
darkness looks’’ Hunt (2001).
It seems to me that the challenge of understanding
words in the mind may benefit greatly from an
examination of the issues addressed by early quantum
physicists as metaphors. It may be, for example, that
words do not have any reality as separate entities in the
mind, but rather exist as superstates that have specific
realizations only when they are observed (Libben
2014). The notion of lexical superstates builds
metaphorically on the claim within the quantum
physics community that particles are in superposition
until they are actually measured at one location or
another. The notion of superposition is related to the
claim of wave-particle duality in quantum physics.
An, electron, for example, can be both particle and
wave, despite the fact that these states seem intuitively
to be mutually exclusive. When observed, an electron
will show itself to have wave or particle properties,
depending on which of these is measured. Up to the
point of measurement, however, it can be said to be in
superposition, being neither (and both) a wave or
particle. According to what has come to be known as
The Copenhagen Interpretation (Heisenberg, 1958), it
is only at the point of observation that there is a
resolution of the state of superposition (also referred to
as the ‘collapse of the wave function’).
A related view for language, and one that I think has
value, is that a word exists as a superstate until it is
observed in one situation or another. In this case, the
observation corresponds to an act of language use.
Thus, to take the word wallpaper, as an example, it is a
noun (e.g., brightly coloured wallpaper) when I use it
as a noun, it is a verb (e.g., to wallpaper a room) when
I use it as a verb) and it has morphological structure
(e.g., wall-paper) when I link it to words such as
wallflower or newspaper.
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It may also be the case that the idea that I possess
the word wallpaper in mymind/brain at all, is illusory.
Rather, it may be the case that the notion of a word as a
particle-like entity only occurs as a result of observa-
tion in the acts of language production or comprehen-
sion and, in particular, conscious reflection on such
acts.
The fact that we can use words in the world, even
the fact that words may be extremely prominent in the
world, does not mean that we need to postulate them
existing as inherently particle-like entities in the mind.
Indeed, in the case of the question of the underlying
nature of lexical knowledge and ability, there is good
reason to suspect that going from things in the world
(especially if those things are artifacts of human
creation) and then ‘‘placing’’ them in the mind, will
lead us further away from, rather than closer to, a
better approximation of the truth.
An excellent demonstration of how such an error
can lead to a scientific dead-end can be seen in the
brilliant, but ultimately incorrect, approach to the
correspondence between mind and brain proposed by
Franz Joseph Gall, who founded the school of
phrenology in the late eighteenth century.
Lessons from phrenology
Franz Joseph Gall was born in 1758 and spent most of
his professional life in Vienna, where he gained fame
as a pioneer of brain dissection techniques and the
analysis of the correspondence between personality
traits, psychological functions, and discrete locations
in the brain. Gall championed the view that the brain
contained discrete organs of thought and that these
were related to specific locations in the brain. His
views gained great popularity in the British Isles and
America in the first half of the nineteenth century and
seemed to provide an almost perfect way to answer,
and address scientifically, fundamental questions
about the correspondence between the contents of
mind and their physical basis in brain structure and
function. The basic hypothesis, as formulated by Gall,
was that cognitive organs or modules corresponded to
faculties, abilities, and propensities. These would
include very basic ones such as cautiousness, as well
as higher ones such as benevolence, conscientious-
ness, wit and wonder. As seems evident, these are not
distributed evenly across the population. Some people
are wittier than others, some are more cautious than
others. Some people seem to be more inclined than
others to wonder. Gall’s physical account for this was
that the amount of the trait or ability possessed by a
person would correspond to the size of that person’s
region of the brain that is associated with the trait or
ability. He reasoned that increases in brain size in
particular locations would place pressure on the skull
from within and would be detectable to the trained
phrenologist as topographical anomalies that could be
felt through palpation of the skull.
By the mid-nineteenth century, phrenology was
largely discredited as a pseudoscience. One reason for
this was that much like hypnotism in later decades,
phrenology turned out to be extremely prone to
charlatanry. The most important reason, though, was
that later evidence showed it to be wrong in its
fundamental claims. The required replicable evidence
in skull topography was not there. And, the funda-
mental claim of traits having existence as wholes in
the brain emerged as an almost complete fallacy of
misplaced concreteness. This did not negate, however,
the validity of the claim that people demonstrate traits
and that different people demonstrate them to different
degrees. Certainly people exhibit cautiousness, con-
scientiousness, wit, and wonder. What we do not know
is whether they actually possess these traits as traits. I
would like to suggest that this is also our situation as
researchers with respect to the notion of a mental
lexicon, indeed with respect to the notion of word
itself.
Words in the mind and brain
Let me suggest at the outset of this section that rather
than talking about the representation or processing of
words in the mind, we should be using alternative
formulations such as ‘‘cognitive processing underly-
ing word naming behaviour’’ or ‘‘cognitive processing
underlying lexical decision performance’’ or ‘‘cogni-
tive knowledge underlying sentence production
behavior’’. Such formulations may help to keep us a
safe distance from the fallacy of misplaced concrete-
ness while at the same time highlighting the fact that
the nature of the observation (in this case, the type of
language behavior) cannot, as was made clear by
Werner Heisenberg in his formulation of the uncer-
tainty principle, be taken out of the equation. Seen
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from this perspective, every type of language
behaviour and its observation in a psycholinguistic
experiment shows us a particular way in which human
language ability can be manifested in the world. Such
a view leads us away from the expectation that we will
ever find a one-to-one correspondence between man-
ifested behavior and the contents of mind and brain, as
the phrenological work of Franz Joseph Gall was
intended to reveal.
The view rather leads us in the opposite direction—
that is, away from one-to-one correspondences and
toward research that calls into question the assump-
tions that we may have inherited from loaded formu-
lations such as ‘‘the representation of words in the
mind’’. Such research would include the work of
Pulvermu¨ler (2001), who has investigated the seman-
tic properties of words and evidence regarding brain
activation associated with their use. It also includes the
work of Elman (2004, 2011) who has called into
question whether we need to postulate a mental
lexicon in order to understand lexical knowledge. In
addition, it includes the research of Baayen and
colleagues (e.g., Baayen 2010; Baayen et al. 2013)
whose work on discriminative learning has challenged
the need to postulate mental representations for
morphemes as meaningful sub-elements of words.
Methods are not neutral
One of the most important early insights in quantum
physics was that it is almost impossible to separate the
method of observation from that which is observed.
Against this background, it is very unlikely that such
methodological neutrality will be achieved in psy-
cholinguistics or any other branch of research on
human cognition.
There is reason to believe that the study of lexical
processing is moving to a state of much greater
adequacy on the methodological front. At the turn of
the millennium, Libben and Jarema (2002) noted that
experimental research on the mental lexicon was
almost fully dominated by a single task, the lexical
decision task. Currently, investigations of lexicon
processing are much more varied, often incorporating
a variety of tasks that yield rich datasets (Libben et al.
2012a, b).
It is important to note that if the quantum perspec-
tive does in fact have relevance to current research on
lexical processing, it is not the case that new methods,
even if they are much more ecologically valid, will be
without drawbacks. By definition, the methods will
always colour our understanding of the nature of
reality. In fact, they are an inextricable component of
that reality. Thus, there are no neutral methods. A brief
discussion of the lexical decision task offers an
illustrative example of this.
The lexical decision task was introduced into the
psycholinguistic literature by Meyer and Schwane-
feldt (1971). The task was almost the perfect vehicle
for developing a form-based theory of words in the
mind—that is, a theory of the mental lexicon. In its
most common visual format, it requires that a partic-
ipant see a word presented on a computer screen and
then indicate as quickly as possible (by pressing a
button labeled ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’) whether or not the word
on the screen is an existing word. Thus, it is a task that
asks participants to answer the question: Is this word in
your mental lexicon?
Almost everything about the lexical decision task is
consistent with the particle-like view of words in the
mind. It constitutes a valuable demonstration of how a
method frames the kinds of questions that can be asked
and the kinds of answers that can be obtained. The
lexical decision task typically presents single words to
be classified. The task employs the type of logic of
response time in cognitive research pioneered by
Donders (1969) and Cattell (1886). It typically deals
with the isolated word form as an element. In this way,
the lexical decision task biases research about the
nature of words in the mind in the direction of words as
particle-like entities. As the lexical decision task
demonstrates, it is possible to present words in
isolation on a screen. It is possible to have language
users reliably indicate whether they are ‘in possession’
of these words. But whether that which is possessed in
the mind/brain is actually a word form may be another
matter entirely.
Focusing on potential forms in the modeling
of mental lexical knowledge
At the outset of this paper, I noted that no research
team has yet looked into a human brain and seen a
word. If indeed the quantum metaphor for the
representation of words in the mind is correct, we
should expect that words, as words, in the mind/brain
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neither have been seen nor will be seen. The nature of
the human capacity for language is much too subtle to
employ a simple store of units. Yet it is obvious that
we do have lexical knowledge. And, to advance our
understanding of that lexical knowledge, representa-
tions in the mind are required. What is needed is a
means by which we can conceptualize words in the
mind in a manner that is concrete enough to provide a
scaffolding for knowledge advancement and also
dissimilar enough from words on pages, or dictionar-
ies on desks to enable us to maintain a safe distance
from the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
In discussing the notion of how lexical superstate
representations may differ from standard notions of
words in the mind, I utilized as an example the
compound word wallpaper. Indeed, I would like to
suggest that compound words offer an extremely
useful class of lexical structures with which to explore
lexical and morphological superstates. The reason for
this is that they are used as single words, but they also
clearly have internal structure and links to other
words. So, compound words enable us to consider
words and their properties in the morphological
domain in a relatively stable and generalizable man-
ner. The stability and generalizability come from the
prevalence and comparability of compound words
across the world’s languages. Compounding is the
most common word formation process (Dressler
2006). Moreover, the major morphological con-
stituents of compound words are lexical, so by using
compounds as core examples we can avoid some of the
challenges associated with the question of whether
there are separate morphological representations for
elements such as com-, par-, -able and -ity in suffixed
words such as comparability.
So what can we learn from considering what mental
representations and processes may be related to our
ability to understand and produce compound words
such as wallpaper? It seems to me that the first thing
that would be learned is that words may have specific
grammatical and semantic properties only when used
in speech and comprehension by a specific person at a
specific time and place. At bottom, those properties are
psychological in nature and derive from individual
language experience. As William James (1890)
stressed, it is experience that is at the core of our
cognitive ability. So, people will differ in how they
represent a word such as wallpaper. For some, it may
have both noun and verb readings, because they have
experience in hearing, seeing, or producing it as both.
For other people, it may have only a single grammat-
ical function. And, the cultural associations will differ
from person to person quite a bit more. For some
people, the compounds wallpaper and wallflower will
be related in the mind. For others less so, if their
dominant meaning association to the term wallflower
is not the southern European plant, but rather the
idiomatic meaning of a person who does not have a
dance partner, and who is generally shy or socially
awkward.
As the above discussion suggests, it is very difficult
to talk about words without ascribing a mental reality
to them. As has been evident throughout our discus-
sion, they clearly do have mental reality, but that
reality may be quite different from the form of the
words that we see on a page. Now, how can we then
use the notion of word in psycholinguistic discourse,
given the fact that our primary tools for the external
representation of lexical knowledge are precisely
those ‘words on a page’? I think that our best approach
is to think of words as encapsulating a set of
possibilities that may or may not be manifested by
individual speakers of a language. Lexical knowledge
is much more than that which is committed to
memory. It is the dynamic system that enables lexical
creativity, growth, and refinement. Thus, a word is not
simply a representation of lexical knowledge pos-
sessed in the mind/brain. It is a representation of
lexical possibilities enabled by the mind/brain.
Summary
In the sections above, I have suggested that the
construct of a mental lexicon, which has served to
advance the field of psycholinguistics so significantly
over the past four decades is in need of fundamental re-
conceptualization. I suggest that indeed it is the
intuitive relation to lexicons in the external world that
places it in need of such re-examination.
I have also claimed that there are critical features of
research on lexical processing that give it metaphor-
ical comparability to research in quantum physics. I
stress the term metaphorical to underline the fact that
this type of proposal is distinct from proposals that
have linked quantum constructs to actual brain struc-
tures and the material basis of consciousness (e.g.,
Penrose 1994).
J Cult Cogn Sci
123
A consideration of the constructs of quantum
physics that seem to have immediate application to
research on lexical processing provides a framework
within which to move beyond a re-conceptualization
of the mental lexicon to a re-examination of the view
that we have words in the mind. It may be the case that,
until they are actually used in productions, what we
call words in the mind exist only as potentials for
realization as specific items with semantic and formal
characteristics. Thus, the fact that words may have
specific properties at the time of observation, does not
require that they have single or specific representa-
tions in the mind. It would be neater and tidier and
perhaps more economical if this were the case. But
there is little reason to believe that the mental system
that serves lexical knowledge is designed to be neat,
tidy, or economical. Much more likely is that the
cognitive system is organized to maximize our
capacity to create meaningful utterances and to
understand them. If this is the case, it is preferable to
consider the mental lexicon, not a the store of words in
the mind, but rather as that cognitive system that
constitutes an individual’s capacity to produce and
comprehend words across modalities and across
contexts. The lexical system does not need to possess
words in order to use words.
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